AITAPE Marion Hess 6 August 1996 Peering over the rails of their ships, the men of the the 124th Infantry Regiment, 31st Division, embarked for overeas duty in January 1944 from Hampton Roads, Va., outfitted in their winter uniforms. All aboard were sure that their destination was Europe to join the buildup for D-Day landings. Sixty five days later they assembled, sweating, at Oro Bay, New Guinea, in the tropical heat of the Southwest Pacific. During the voyage indoctrination was given in the perils of the jungle. The Japanese soldier was described to the raw American troops as an intrepid jungle fighter. Two months after arrival, the 124th RCT, 31st Infantry Division, combat loaded, was ordered to Aitape, New Guinea attached to the 32nd Division to join them in combat on the Driniumor River, one of the great, yet little known campaigns of World War II. Their baptism of fire is described in an extract from Gen. Douglas MacArthur's Daily Summary #871, dated 9/10 August, 1944. "The 124th Infantry's counter envelopment which by rapid expansion of its driving east to Afua...is possibly unparalleled in the history of military maneuver over this type of terrain." To chronicle their initial introduction into jungle warfare, it is necessary to know what transpired in the months preceding their assignment to Aitape. American and Australian forces had retaken much of the New Guinea territory held by the Japanese 18th Army, commanded by Japanese Lt. General Hatazo Adachi. The allies were leap-frogging up the coast ever closer in support of MacArthur's promise to return to the Philippines. Two critical areas remained in Japanese hands: Wewak-Hansa Bay and Hollandia-Aitape. Assuming that the Allies' next target would be Wewak, the Japanese 18th Army's 20th, 41st, and 51st Divisions (totalling approximately 50,000 men) were concentrated there, leaving Hollandia only lightly defended. On April 22, 1944, elements of the U.S. Sixth Army, commanded by Lt. General Walter Krueger, attacked Hollandia, isolating Adachi's troops in Wewak. Capture of its three airfields was achieved with few casualties to the invading U.S. 41st and 24th Divisions. That same day, the 1st Battalion, 163rd RCT, 41st Division, and the 127th RCT, 32nd Division (Task Force PERSECUTION) landed at Aitape and secured the Tadji airdrome. Aitape, 120 miles east of Hollandia and 90 miles west of Wewak, lies between the ocean on the north and the Torricelli Mountains, 10 miles to the south. The airfields were necessary to provide air cover and supplies to Hollandia and would serve as an eastern defense sector. Early in May the remainder of 32nd Division closed at Aitape and assumed the defense of the area. A Main Line of Resistance (MLR) was established around the Tadji airfields. Vigorous patrolling was initiated when intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese 20th and 41st Divisions were advancing towards Aitape intent on retaking their Hollandia base. In response to this, an Outpost Line of Resistance (OPLR) was established along the Driniunor 10 miles east of Aitape. Between the MLR and the OPLR were only the Nigia River, River X, streams, swamps and dense jungle. Motor transport was possible only along the beach. It was hot. The air was fetid and it rained every day keeping the terrain a treacherous quagmire. By the latter part of June, the Japanese had established a strong counter reconnaissance screen east of the Driniumor River which U.S. patrols could not pierce. The jungle was too dense, making even air reconnaissance useless. General Adachi had moved his army plus their mortars, machine guns, light artillery and supplies 80 to 100 miles over jungle terrain in about 30 days, almost entirely on foot and at night. Captured documents and intelligence reports indicated that Adachi planed to attack and breach the Drinumor River Line 3,000 yards inland on July 10 and attack to envelop the right flank. General Kreuger requested reinforcements for the OPLR. The 112th Cavalry RCT, the 43rd Division and the 124th RCT were made available. Of these, only the 124th had no combat experience. The 112th Cavalry RCT joined the three battalions already on the river taking a position on the right flank. The 124th RCT would be held in reserve. The 43rd Division would arrive some weeks later. Patrols in early July detected an increase in enemy activity with all signs pointing to an imminent attack 3,000 yards from the mouth of the Driniumor River and a possible attack to envelop the right flank. Even though the Japanese attacks were expected and his subordinate commanders wanted to dig in and wait out the attack, General Krueger, frustrated by conflicting intelligence, ordered a reconnaissance in force from each end of the line to flush out Adachi's forces. At midnight that same day, three battalions of Japanese (approximately 20,000 soldiers) came screaming out of the jungle crossing the river. The first and second waves were cut to pieces by withering artillery fire, concentrated mortar and automatic weapon fire and barbed wire emplacements. With the U.S. troops out of ammunition, the third wave, reached the west bank of the Driniumor River relatively intact and passed through gaps in the now thinly defended river line. The ferocity of the assualt had caused the river to be dammed in places by more than 3,000 Japanese dead. The covering force, out-numbered 10-to-1, fell back and a breach of 1,200 yards was created in the defense line. A second attack the next day widened the breach to 2,000 yards. Brig. Gen. Clarence Martin, commanding the Driniumor River covering force, with no reserves to call on, ordered the 127th and 128th Infantry units to withdraw and regroup at River X and Koronal Creek. Hampered by terrain, rain, and lack of communications, the withdrawal was not completed until July 13. Maj. General William Gill, Commander, 32nd Division, replacing a tired General Martin, assumed command of the Persecution Covering Force. General Gill, critical of 6th Army Headquarter's ignoring the warnings of the impending Japanese attack, reorganized his line. He ordered the 112th Cavalry and 3rd Battalion, with 127th Infantry to anchor the southern end of the line designating them BALDY FORCE. The untested 1st and 3rd Battalions, 124th Infantry, and veteran 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, were ordered to counter attack to regain the river line. Four battalions of field artillery would provide supporting fire from the beach. On July 13, under cover of darkness, the units moved out. From Anamo Village, the 124th, in parallel columns attacked south and the 128th attacked east. BALDY FORCE attacked east from River X. Advancing against strong resistence behind curtains of artillery fire, they dug in at night, ordered not to leave their foxholes and shoot anything that moved. The Driniumor River line was reestablished on July 15. The Japanese forces that achieved the breakthrough were now trapped between the Nigia and the Driniumor Rivers. Two battalions of the 127th Infantry, 32nd Division, reinforced the river line and a broad sweep by all units resulted in good results. The enemy made efforts to escape back across the river. Most of them were killed and by now the terrain along the Driniumor River was an olfactory horror due to the several thousand Japanese dead in the area. The covering force engaged in fierce firefights taking many casualties but by July 21, the sweep of the area was completed, although an estimated 300-500 enemy troops remained, with infiltrations and skirmishes still occurring. Intelligence indicated that Adachi was attempting to adhere to his original plan to take Tadji and was regrouping his 41st Division across the river. Elements of his 20th Division continued to try to turn the south flank held by the now pinned down BALDY FORCE. Japanese soldiers dressed in American uniforms from captured depots, added to the confusion. One cavalryman said later, "Unless you looked them in the face, you didn't know whether they were enemy or not. As of July 2, 1944, reports indicated that elements of the Japanese 41st and 20th Divisions were concentrating south and west of Afua. Both units were understrength, disorganized and lacked supplies but were still ready to fight. By now plans were made for the Americans to attack the remaining enemy east of the Driniumor River, cut off the forces harassing the south flank and eliminate organized Japanese resistance. This task was assigned to the 124th RCT, the unit General Krueger had initially rejected because of their lack of experience. They were designated TED FORCE under the command of Col. Edward M. (Ted) Starr, and included 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions, 124th RCT, with the 2nd Battalion, 168th RCT, 43rd Division. TED FORCE code names were BUTCH (1/124), FOWLER (2/124), PAPPY (3/124), and LEWIS (2/169). Also attached were the 149th Field Artillery and the 106th Medical Battalion. They were ordered to move out on July 31 and clear the area east of the Driniumor River of the remaining Japanese 18th Army. These troops, new to combat 15 days before, had gained confidence that would pay dividends in lives saved and enemy killed in the near future. Their daily interaction with the 32nd Division combat veterans had served as training to dispel the superman theory of the Japanese jungle fighter. In terrain called indescribable, area between the Driniumor River to Niumen Creek was approximately two and one half miles wide and six miles long, bound by the ocean on the north and the mountains to the south. There were no vantage points; no observation except that cut into the bush; no fields of fire more than three to five yards wide except that cut by machete and no natural routes of communication. Niumen Creek was the only source of water and its tributaries covered the jungle floor adding to soggy footing. Daily rains, adding to the humidity, kept the troops constantly wet and tired requiring halts every 20 minutes of march. Communications were relayed through artillery spotter planes when dampness rendered the radios useless. Re-supply to the American ground forces could only be accomplished by airdrops from C-47's. Fighting the terrain was almost on par with fighting the enemy. This was the battlefield into which TED FORCE advanced at 0800 July 31, 1994. 2nd, 1st, and 3rd Battalions, in that order, echeloned from north to south along the river line with their left flank on the coast and their right flank 3,500 yards inland. They were ordered to advance to Niumen Creek, then with four battalions abreast, turn 90 degrees south to the Afua Trail and the Torricelli foothills. East of Afua, they would swing 90 degrees west back to the Driniumor River enveloping the Japanese 18th Army forcing the remnants into the mountains. Using trails made by the Japanese on their march from Wewak, FOWLER, PAPPY, and LEWIS, reached Niumen Creek with light opposition. BUTCH, moving through swamps, was strongly opposed. C Company was ambushed by an enemy platoon using Nambu light machine guns delaying their arrival at the creek until the following day. Radio problems arose the first day out when he could not reach regimental headquarters less then two miles away. TED FORCE utilized the second day to consolidate position, clear stray Japanese and prepare for the next attack. The advance continued southwest on August 3rd with PAPPY on the lest and LEWIS on the right. Within an hour both were heavily engaged by sniper fire resulting in heavy casualties. Japanese smokeless powder made it difficult to locate the snipers. When queried as to the hold-up, PAPPY answered back, "I'll be damned if I know; we haven't seen over five Japs but the bullets are coming in every direction." PAPPY and LEWIS gained only 150 yards in the jungle that day. BUTCH turned south and, meeting little resistance, gained 1,000 yards to the west of LEWIS. Casualties brought into the regimental aid station were transported back to the Driniumor by a platoon of FOWLER's battalion. This was the last litter train to leave the regiment until seven days later. Henceforth, the dead would be buried and the wounded carried by the troops. PAPPY and LEWIS, unable to advance, dropped back approximately 100 yards. The 149th Field Artillery was registered in and during the night fired on the entire front with good results. A much needed ration and ammunition drop arrived the next morning, August 4th. Retrieving airdrops would prove to be a problem throughout the entire maneuver since the enemy was hungry too and fought the Americans for the smashed and scattered supplies. When the advance continued on 4 August, BUTCH, on the right, was ordered to advance to the Afua Trail, bypassing the enemy if necessary, to set up a roadblock to close off the their escape route. The terrain was so dense their rate of advance was estimated to be 100 yards an hour. Cutting through each yard, the lead platoon changed every hour and squads changed at 15 minutes intervals. PAPPY and LEWIS moved out encountering scattered enemy fire, attesting to the efficiency of the previous night's artillery fire. FOWLER's 2nd battalion captured three Japanese soldiers who expressed surprise that Americans were so deep into the jungle. Documents taken from them, including code books and the overall plans for the 18th Army's maneuvers, were sent back to headquarters. Twelve 75mm artillery piece were destroyed and skirmishes continued along the march. Casualties were mounting but by 5 August both PAPPY and LEWIS were on the Afua Trail with LEWIS behind and to their left. BUTCH finally reached the trail and established the trailblock perimeter providing some security on the right flank. General Adachi, learning of TED FORCE on 3 August, ordered his army to retreat southeast into the mountains. Remnants of his 237th Infantry and 8th Independent Engineers were positioned to his rear at the junction of Afua Trail and Niumen Creek. On August 5th, PAPPY encountered an estimated company-strength emplacement on a 1,000 foot hill overlooking the trail. 3rd Battalion was in a terrain pocket with towering hills on both flanks. Unable to dislodge the enemy with mortar fire, PAPPY was ordered to withdrawal 100 yards and set up a perimeter. At 0300, the perimeter was attacked from all sides by an estimated two companies of Japanese desperate to keep their supplies lines open. Casualties mounted as wave after wave of suicidal troops attacked. By morning, the entire perimeter was under machine gun fire from surrounding hills. LEWIS, ordered south on PAPPY's left flank, become disoriented in the dense jungle. Regimental Headquarters and the Anti-Tank Company closed on PAPPY's rear position and established a perimeter which enabled him to withdrawal another 100 yards to allow artillery and mortars to dislodge the enemy. Japanese 75mm mountain guns had been moved into position and placed direct fire from the front and both flanks on PAPPY and FOWLER. Sniper fire in the rear made any movement along the creek almost impossible. The Japanese now controlled the commanding terrain and had complete freedom of maneuver. The Japanese fought the battalion's rear guard throughout the move in the most difficult terrain encountered so far and it was after dark when the battalion closed into the perimeter. From this point on progress would be slow due to the number of litters being carried. In this, the bloodiest fight so far, 3rd Battalion had killed over 200 Japanese and sustained casualties of 10 killed and 24 wounded. The artillery barrage had enabled FOWLER to move around the right flank forcing the holding force to withdraw to the south leaving 425 dead and large amounts of weapons. PAPPY followed FOWLER to the west. With the exception of one rifle company, his entire battalion and the Anti-Tank Company (equipped as infantry) was immobilized carrying litter cases. Each litter required 10 men to manipulate it over the razor back ridges saturated by continuous rain. Rain had also prevented air-drops for three days. Improvised litters were fashioned from ponchos and saplings. Lack of food and sleep added to the men's fatigue. By nightfall, PAPPY and FOWLER were in perimeter. LEWIS was still trying to find his way south through the jungle and BUTCH, maintaining the trailblock, had begun to encounter enemy columns moving south and east. With three battalions on the Afua Trail, it was now possible to make the second turn back to the Driniumor River. FOWLER met scattered resistance over rough terrain with PAPPY and the Command Post following slowly due to litter cases. LEWIS had also turned west and met heavy opposition which held out all day. He too, was carrying many litters. At the end of the day, the three 124th RCT battalions were abreast with LEWIS one day's march to the rear. For the Americans the next morning started out badly. In BUTCH's area at dawn, as his men were getting out of their foxholes, friendly artillery fire killed four and wounded 35 men. It was fired by an artillery battalion of the 32nd Division. An artillery spotter had mistaken them for enemy troops. His litter cases were ordered to the command post to join PAPPY's, awaiting native litter trains on their way from Afua. In addition to the wounded, dysentery, malaria and dengue fever were taking a toll. At 1600 the native train arrived, bringing much needed rations, and relieved the regiment of the litter patients who were by now in great pain. Wounds that would have normally required little or no hospitalization were now infected and festering. With the wounded on their way to an aid station, the three battalions joined BALDY FORCE at the river completing the pincer. This last march was not without incident. BUTCH and FOWLER had met and destroyed numerous Japanese parties and overrun three Japanese hospitals. The enemy wounded had been left with a rifle or grenade and committed "honorable death," killing themselves. LEWIS, still about 1,000 yards to the rear, advanced slowly through the terrain with 14 litter cases. He buried several on the way. TED FORCE reached the Driniumor River on August 10th. The men, fully clothed, had their first bath in 10 days. When LEWIS arrived, they began the five mile march along the river back to their starting point. They arrived at the beach in rotting uniforms, with hair to their shoulders, feet, cracked and bleeding from jungle rot. So tired, they had to push and pull each other into the waiting trucks. Questions put to the exhausted soldiers were answered with "thousand yard stares." Though inexeperienced in jungle warfare, their record was enviable. Suffering 380 casualties, they had killed an estimated 1800 of the enemy and forced the remainder of the Japanese 18th Army into the mountains or back to Wewak. Adachi surrendured to Maj. General H.C.H. Robertson, Australian Sixth Army Division, on September 13, 1944. Later, in May 1945, Adachi commited hari-kiri. Morale was high when the troops of the 124th were transported back to Tadji for a much deserved rest, though for some the task remained unfinished. They had to retrace their steps in jungle to bring back their fallen comrades back for proper funerals. The leadership of Lt. Col. George D. Williams (PAPPY) earned him the Distinguished Service Cross. His 3rd Battalion was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. Numerous Silver and Bronze Stars were awarded for valor. A rested and tested 124th Infantry Regiment rejoined the 31st Infantry "DIXIE" Division. Thirty days later, the 31st Division landed and captured the island of Morotai, NEI, the last stepping stone in MacArthur's march to the Philippines. Their final campaign of World War II was the invasion of Mindanao, the largest of the Philippine islands, where the 2nd Battalion, 124th RCT, and the 106th Medical Detachment, 124th Infantry, were awarded Battle Honors. At the beginning of this account, Aitape was described as a great, yet little known campaign. The following observations may provide some additional historical perspective. In the intervening years since the end of World War II, the New Guinea campaign has largely been overshadowed, with little written about the campaign as a whole. Usually the accounts focus on MacArthur's island-hopping tactics, bypassing the Japanense troops with little American blood shed and easy victories. It is true the some landings were made unopposed and terrirtory secured quickly at little initial cost, but that is not the whole story. MacArthur was inclined to declare campaigns over prematurely and describe the ensuing bloody battles as "mopping up" actions. In competition with Navy Admiral Chester Nimitz for overall command in the Pacific, the favorable results reported by New Guinea communiques, compared to those of Saipan and Tawara, added to the debate as to who was the more competent commander. At Southwest Pacific Headquarters, public relations was of paramount importance. In reality, some of the New Guinea battles, such as Aitape, had hardly begun. American losses at Aitape totaled 400 men killed, 2250 wounded, and 10 missing. Add to that the Australian losses at Aitape-Hollandia through the end of the war (451 killed, 1163 wounded, and three missing), and Aitape becomes one of the costliest campaigns of the Pacific war. The communiques generated under MacArthur's public relations rules did not permit the full story of his troops to be told. If it had been, perhaps their deeds would have had a just place in history, and be recognized today for fighting some of the bloodiest battles of the Pacific war under conditions considered as the most difficult of the war. Sources: 1. New Guinea Campaign by Nathan Prefer 2. Defending the Driniumor by Edward J. Drea 3. 124th Infantry Unit Journals 4. Driniumor River Campaign, Logan Narrative, Florida Department of Military Affairs ------------------------------------------------------------------ Source: http://www.grunts.net/army/stories/aitape.html (now offline) Marion Hess died on 29 August 2001. Transcribed and edited by Paul M. Webber on 19 January 2002 Home Page: http://home.pcisys.net/~pwebber/31_id/rtw.htm